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The Location and Theory of Looking 
John Freeman 
Art is what happens when you take an object out of context and j ive it anew 
thought. -Marcel Duchamp1 
Is this (1917) definition of art still relevant? Still resonant? Has critical 
theory taken us closer to an understanding of the nature of art? Are answers 
possible? Does the dissemination of the findings (the probings) of investigation 
reveal the research or the researcher? Can that which seeks to challenge 
convention be dissected according to the conventional schema it strives to corrupt? 
Can the term "skills-based" refer as readily to conceptualization, innovation, and 
presentation as to technique, repetition, and representation? Why does the artist 
make art? Damien Hirst has said, "I sometimes feel as if I have nothing to say, 
I often want to communicate this" (Lee 6-8). Chris Burden says, "I don't think 
art should have any purpose" (18). Are these positions at odds or in line with 
contemporary views on the artist's role? When Picabia drew a picture, which 
Breton immediately erased, did (does) the 'power' of the work reside in the 
collaborative ephermality of the action or in the residuum of a loaded absence of 
lines (Mann 108)? In the event or in the object? Have notions of creativity (since 
Duchamp?) been rendered obsolete in a world where selective eclecticism seems 
to make plagiarism its ploy? Where concepts of philistinism collapse and self-
destruct? Where the million dollar copy is as 'real' as the chintz original? 
A number of different aesthetic theories have been proposed with the aim 
of discovering what it is that all works of art (all works of theatre? all works of 
performance?) share: the general consensus seems to be that these common 
elements are imitation, expression or form (Sheppard). The relationship of 
performance to these ostensibly vitally linked phenomena will form the core of 
this paper . . . a paper wherein the concern is not so much with an appraisal of 
the (in)accuracy of taxonomical distinction, as an exploration of the contemporary 
performative event within and against a framework of existing criteria. 
We might, during the course of this essay, reasonably ask ourselves what 
sorts of judgement we make when we critique works of theatre, works of art. We 
might further consider whether the watcher's interpretation can be valued above 
the intentions of the watched . . . explore the instablity of the basis, the always 
unfixed ground, on which we say, with the well-rehearsed rhetoric of scholarly 
'expertise,' that our critical interpretations are justified and justifiable. We might 
question whether or not we feel that the artist has certain obligations and whether 
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the audience is similarly 'obliged.' If, during the process of self-reflection, we 
are willing to accept that our perceptions of theatre (of all art) are based on a 
mixture of experience and expectation, does it follow that the notion, the old 
academic bedrock, of 'objectivity' is in any way possible and/or desirable? Do 
we feel that the view of culture contained within postmodern sensibility has led 
to such an irrevocable pluralism that any and all notions of the 'authoritative 
view' are discredited? In what sense, if any, we need to ask ourselves, can a 
work of theatre either have 'meaning' or convey 'truth'? Picasso called art "the 
lie that tells the truth": can a 'lie' be 'truthful'? Is all performative presentation 
intrinsically representational, in as much as the body is always 'representative' of 
something else: of gender, of age, of 'type'? 
Who defines the object or event as 'art'? Is it the maker or the receiver? 
If I choose to view 'life' as 'art' does the application of the word ('art') serve as 
its own definition? Can everyday activity be 'theatre' without any applied 
theatricality? Can 'life' become 'art' with no applied 'art-ness'? Can the 
unlicensed and non-negotiated gaze transform that which (that who) it rests upon, 
without the compliance, or even the knowledge, of the recipient of the gaze? If 
theatre involves an implicit relationship with convention, with tradition, to what 
extent is it possible to step beyond accepted (acceptable) practice and still be seen 
as 'theatre'? 
Performance has continually addressed (and had addressed for it) the 
question of what it is. Moreover, the specific forms within performance: 
Theatre, Performance Art, Happenings, and certain Installations, have been 
subject to the same attempt to secure and establish their own genre-specifc 
boundaries—a feat made more complex (not to say self-defeating) by the notion 
of marginality and slippage as (un)stated aims. Attempts to erect and maintain 
harmonious justifications as to what differentiates 'art' from 'non-art,' 'theatre' 
from 'performance' and 'performance' from 'life' will always be insecure, and, 
indeed, will become increasingly less stable, as long as a working with(in) the slip 
of stability remains one of the identifiable elements that helps mark out and 
separate the contemporary (the progressive) from the mainstream (the repetitive). 
To what extent do notions of morality determine, or intrude upon, our 
perceptions of what is and what is not (acceptable) art? For example, Joseph 
(John) Merrick, the so-called 'Elephant-Man,' was presented, quite legally, to the 
paying public. Was this (simply) as Merrick's manager claimed, a 
"demonstration of the wonders of nature" (Altick, R.D.); an act of glorification; 
or an artistically framed presentation? In countries where executions are legal, 
does the public nature of the act (and the attendant crowd) create what might quite 
logically be termed a 'dramatic presentation'? Robert Wilson presented a two-
person show, Dialog Curious George, with Christopher Knowles (in a theatre and 
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to a paying audience) into a series of responses. Does the context, the theatre, 
the audience, etc. (to say nothing of Wilson's directorial intention) legitimize the 
activity as art? Scheduler writes: 
Knowles was an elephant bowing at the circus . . . whatever his 
remarks meant to members of the audience they meant, or 
were, something else to Knowles. Because Knowles couldn't 
lie, he couldn't be an actor . . . he could only be situated and 
displayed as if he were an actor inside Wilson's show (38). 
Does this 'lack of knowing(ness)' on the part of the 'performer' prevent 
the work from being 'theatre'? Do moral objections have any place in discussions 
of art? If Orlan chooses to alter her appearance through cosmetic surgery as art 
(making herself 'ugly' rather than more 'beautiful') can we (should we) separate 
issues of morality and aesthetics? Choosing to disregard Wittgenstein's theory 
that doubt is a requisite of knowledge, Roger Kimball, the author of Tenured 
Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education, is emphatic in the 
certaintly of his assertion that "raids on the fringes of extremity have helped to 
transform the art world into a moral cesspool" {Guardian 27), continuing in this 
vein to claim that "the relationship between freedom of expression and the limits 
of acceptable behavior . . . are not necessarily the same" (27), that the legal right 
to make certain kinds of art should not hold sway over the (potential) impact of 
its moral unpleasantness. Kimball's position raises the question of the extent to 
which 'morality' itself is defined by taste (and its flipside, prejudice), alongside 
the wide-ranging implications on an art (on a theatre) that denies, or is denied, 
certain subjects. The suggestion that a performance is 'morally bad' usually 
carries with it the implication that the presentation will somehow corrupt its 
audience. We hear this argument more often applied to cinema than to theatre 
. . . though there are noted (notorious?) examples to the contrary, such as Edward 
Bond's Saved (1965) and Howard Brenton's Romans in Britain (1980). The 
argument that art can corrupt is not a new one . . . in 1851, The Edinburgh 
Review contained the following section: 
One powerful agent for depraving the boyish classes of our 
population in our towns and cities is to be found in the cheap 
concerts, shows and theatres . . . when our fear of interfering 
with personal and public liberty allows these shows and theatres 
to be training schools of the coarsest and most open vice and 
filthiness—it is not to be wondered at, that the boy who is led 
on to haunt them becomes rapidly corrupted and demoralized, 
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and seeks to be the doer of the infamies which have interested 
him as a spectator (Barker and Petley 68-69). 
Are suggestions that films (such as Reservoir Dogs, Taxi Driver and the 
Child's Play trilogy) are potentially corrupting, or de-sensitizing, whereas plays 
(such as King Lear, A Streetcar Named Desire and Medea) are generally not, 
concerned with issues of graphic 'realism' or cultural elitism? It is useful to 
remember that Charles Manson claimed to have been guided by certain Beatles 
tracks (played backwards); after shooting John Lennon, Mark Chapman sat down 
next to the body and read a copy of Catcher in the Rye; whilst Peter Sutcliffe was 
'inspired' to his killing spree by repeated readings of The Bible. 
Britain was later than almost every country in the west to grant a general 
release to the David Cronenberg film, Crash, for fear that it would "deprave and 
corrupt" (B.B.F.C.); a number of councils have acted independently in banning 
the film from their screens . . . a film which one must be an adult to view, whilst 
the book is on sale in those same cities to anyone with £6.99. Is this just? Is this 
protection of the 'moral majority' or prejudice that favors literature over 'popular 
art'? It might be argued that in making decisions of censorship based entirely on 
one's own ethical convictions, the maker of the decision (the censor) is implicitly 
proposing a negative view of the dissenting 'other' as a morally inferior being. 
This notion is embodied in "The Government Green Paper on Broadcasting, 
1988," in its decree that nothing shall be shown "which offends against good 
taste. " If the function of art "is to extend and deepen our perception, experience 
and understanding of the world" (Watson 5) and also to "propose radically new 
forms for making sense of (that) world" (Watson 5), then censorship based on 
issues of 'taste' becomes a contradiction in terms. Who defines 'taste,' and by 
what criterion is one's taste recognizably 'good'? Why will broadcasters show 
a body shot dead in the same frame that they replace the word 'fuck' with 'frig'? 
Why are representations of murder (an illegal act) readily available, when 
representations of sex (a legal act) are not? 
Writing in 1990, Bruce Wilshire, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers 
University, argued that "if an alleged theatrical . . . activity extends into the 
ethical domain, and it is clearly bad morally, we are beyond theatrical categories 
of description and evaluation" (Wilshire T122). But, not least within the assumed 
'freedom' of artistic endeavor, who among us can define the act as "clearly bad"? 
Is the Marcus Harvey portrait of convicted killer, Myra Hindley—made up of a 
four year old child's hand prints—'immoral art' or art that depicts immorality? 
Does the 'guilt' of the nature depicted so infect the reflection in the mirror of art 
that we are unable to discern any distinction between the two? To separate the 
barbarity of the murders from art that serves, in the manner of the making and the 
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scale of the made, as a shocking reminder? Criminal law divides offences into 
malum en se—those which are wrong in themselves—and malum prohibita—those 
which context and intention contrive to define. If Kimball's dismissively 
hysterical description of a great swathe of artists as "knaves, charlatans (and) 
eager hucksters" (he cites, amongst others, the "grotesque" Karen Finley, the 
"sloganeering (and) incomprehensible" Cindy Sherman and the "pathetic" Chris 
Burden) condemns the aesthetically displeasing to the ranks of the inherently evil, 
then Wilshire's more measured prose is ultimately no less damning. 
Certainly, art has the capacity to alter the emotional state of the receiver, 
whether by explicit design, in the case of pornography or generic advertising, for 
example, or by association, witnessed in certain types of music, from film 
soundtracks a la Psycho to the Muzak of the elevator and the shopping mall; but 
to suggest that overtly 'created' art has a power that is denied to the documentary 
seems bizarre: if watching Rambo can de-sensitize us to aggression, why wouldn't 
watching Alain Prost make us drive more quickly? If watching Jean Claude Van 
Damme suggests violence as a solution to problems, why wouldn't this same 
'truth' apply when the camera shows one 'sportsman' punching another on the 
field of play, when we see one country invading another? 
Hirst says that his art "opens a path for the viewer into areas of 
experience which are not anti-moral or amoral, but extra-moral. We take a 
holiday from our ethics into a world created from death and violence about which 
we are invited not to care—a world where bad taste is driven to the point of 
elegance, and disgust filtered into delight" (Burns). To what extent can Hirst's 
thoughts be said to exemplify contemporary views? Are they acceptable? How 
is a line drawn between Hirst and the 1988 Green Paper comments on 'good 
taste'? Between the artist and the state? Between expression and repression? 
Does the act of imitation offer up its own defense? Is it the reality of Harvey's 
borrowed hand prints that offends? Does 'pretense' incite less virulent passion 
than a 'presence' which exceeds its frame? We are aware that imitation was one 
of the earliest theoretical views on art: we know that Plato believed in ideal 
qualities, ideal forms, and felt that it was the job of art to imitate these qualities. 
Plato's view places an intrinsically diminishing value on art, in as much as art, 
by its nature, is always inferior to life. Richard Scheduler says a similar thing 
. . . namely that experience is raw and art is cooked . . . ergo the one must 
always follow the other and never vice versa. 
If we accord to theories of imitation, does it follow that the most highly 
regarded art is that which most accurately (most closely) imitates 'life' (the 
Platonic ideal)? The answer is almost certainly 'no.' For example, waxworks at 
Madame Tussaud's are (generally) not highly regarded as 'art' (Searle 14-15). 
In principle, works of art are not valued just because they are imitative. 
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Certainly, we know that works which are not imitative at all may be valued 
highly: not just abstract art (in its broadest sense), but almost all music, for 
instance. Imitation does not fully (perhaps not at all!) explain why it is that we 
create spaces in society for art to exist, or indeed to what state 'it' is that art 
aspires. 
Total illusion is rare in theatre. Invisible theatre may be the closest we 
get to the phenomenon. With naturalism or realism, even at their most extreme 
(the paradigm of rehearsal to the point of seeming spontaneity) we are unlikely 
to 'believe' the events on stage. Suspension of disbelief is not the same thing as 
belief: we adhere to the convention of taking the on-stage world for the 'real 
world' at the same time as we know all the time that it is not. A very similar 
thing happens to actors working within a naturalistic convention. Whereas 
'reality' is identified by its irreversibility, by its once-only-ness, 'realism' is 
defined by its rehearsed ability to be repeated and rephrased ad infinitum. The 
two are antithetical in the extreme, for the one thing that realism can never 
achieve is the reality it strives so hard to depict. One could go further and 
suggest that the greater the success of this searching for mimetic authenticity, the 
further one travels from the source. The adherence to a naturalist/ realist mode 
demands that the essence of performance is that which is being performed rather 
than s/he who is performing, and that "the performer's prime function is to 
reduce her or his own self in order to act as a transmitter for an intentionality 
which is contained within the otherness of character" (Freeman, J); to "conceal 
those traits of character which would otherwise distinguish the representor from 
the represented" (Freeman, J). If the craft of realism is the pursuit of 
representation which denies itself by virtue of its own raison d'etre, then the 
world of absurdity looms somewhat closer than disciples of the method school 
might like to think. 
It is fair to say at this stage that we can anticipate serious flaws in 
representation-as-convention as a benchmark for an appreciation of performance 
when we start to attend to the work of those: Acconci, Burden, Orlan, Gray, 
Abramovic et al, who present themselves (or, more accurately, their performative 
or performatized selves) as both artist and art-object. Conversely, if it emerges 
that the notion of 'pure' presentation is no more than an impossible and, ironically 
enough, self-denying myth, making representation an inevitable consequence of 
the process (or even the description) of display, then the attempt at 'presenting the 
real' (the bicycle wheel, the gunshot wound, the pentagram carved into the flesh) 
stands as a doubly powerful method of conveying the complexity at the crux of 
art through the simplicity of the otherwise unmediated self. 
Whatever the specific rationale, many contemporary artists are 
demonstrating a desire to locate the body (often, though not always, the artist's 
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own) as that which provide material for their practice. Bill Viola has written that 
"The larger struggle we are witnessing today is not between conflicting moral 
beliefs, between the legal system and individual freedom, between nature and 
technology; it is between our inner and outer lives, and our bodies are the area 
where this belief is being played out" (Viola 132). The work of art (the 
performance) is now directing the receiver towards the artists themselves, so that 
the performance (the art) becomes an illustration of the fact(s) of the 
performer(s). The performance is thus inclined towards the transparency, which, 
in lieu of artifice, inclines our understanding to the maker via the made. This is 
not to suggest that the 'work,' in this case, the performer's body, functions as an 
unmediated object, rather, to use Julia Kristeva's terminology, the use of the body 
is made 'abject,' in as much as it is "neither subject nor object . . . when one is 
in a state of abjection, the borders between the object and the subject cannot be 
maintained" (Penwarden 22). The body as representation of the self draws clearly 
on the ready-mades of Duchamp, on a desire for 'authentic' expression by means 
other than mimetic transformation, tracing a line through a century of art and an 
inheritance of conceptual practice. The 'ready-made body' is intrinsically 
transformative: it recognizes itself (and asks the viewer to recognize it) as an 
artificial construction at the same time as it blurs the edge between the as and the 
as if; in this way, the "text/object confrontation . . . the clash of the literal and 
the metaphoric (and) the irony of artistic creation through reiteration of the 
already used" (James 277) foregrounds the play of the here and now in the place 
of the there and then. 
If we are unable to articulate a coherent distinction between aesthetics 
and ethics, between the copy and the source, between 'art' and 'life,' how 
unstable are distinctions between forms? The edges can blur in even the most 
mainstream of work: Frederick Church offered an early example of content being 
radically redefined by context, when his landscape, Heart of the Andes, toured 
major US cities and was subsequently 'staged' in halls, surrounded by soft lights 
and framed with live greenery, inviting the spectator to view the painted 
mountains as if from a glade. The spectators were further invited to view the 
painting through opera glasses, allowing the eye to explore the view section by 
section. As a type of compensation for the immobility of the presentation, the 
spectator was encouraged to take an overtly 'active' role: to animate the painting 
through imaginative performance: to turn the art (object) into an (art) event. 
Certainly, we know that distinctions within the performing arts are relatively 
recent. As Bernard Beckerman points out: 
Traditional performance, whether in Africa, the Orient, or 
Ancient Greece, did not separate vocal music, speech, dance 
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and instrumental music as rigidly as we do. Even the theatre 
of the eighteenth century combined music, dance and drama on 
one bill (12-13). 
Changes occur in art, and, subsequently, in the way we view and receive 
art, by the deliberate exploitation of conventions. Is it form that changes art or 
is it content? Can we divorce the two? If we take the view that art is imitation 
to mean that all art is representational are we wrong? In the context of 
performance, can we distinguish between representation and presentation in 
terms, at least, of intent? Is the presentation of the self intrinsically 
representational, in as much as in making myself (my 'self') public I am engaging 
in an intrinsically representational (re)presentational process? (Lewis 13). Most 
music is not representational, most abstract painting is not representational . . . 
almost all theatre is. Does this mean that 'art' cannot be judged generically? Are 
there different 'rules' for different forms? 
Progressive performance continues to demonstrate a marked 
disinclination to engage in representation as the pursuit of the illusionary 'other.' 
We could say that a feature of this work is its aspiration to foreground its own 
practice, to represent above all else its own processes of representation. 
Paradoxically, in accepting (in literally 'applauding') this move away from 
mimetic representation, alongside a generic distrust of the processes through 
which art might be seen to (seek to) create a version of reality via universal truth, 
one is making a space for this essentially postmodernist position to constitute the 
clear holding up of a mirror to (human) nature. For if 'reality' is increasingly 
deemed to be a thing unfixed and unrealizable, then it follows that an art which 
is mimetic, in the truest sense, will have no real option but to adhere to this 
increasingly fragmented world-view. If 'reality' has lost the objective currency 
(the closure) of the authoritative, then postmodern practice is at its most mimetic 
in exactly those moments when it emphatically resists the urge towards conclusion 
via fixity; when it holds the mirror of art up to the representational structures that 
define the 'it' of art as the 'it' of life. 'Performance,' like 'life,' is exposed as 
an endless construction . . . in the same way, postmodern performance might be 
most fruitfully understood as the representational mimesis of a postmodern world. 
That the subversion of performance cannot be established except by 
performative means is a given; in this way, postmodernism utilizes the 
innovations of modernism at the same time as it offers a rejection of modernism's 
very ideologies and beliefs. In this plundering of previous forms, alongside a 
very real disinclination to locate that which is taken within its original frame, 
postmodernism demonstrates its own perspective on the past as another world: 
as history stripped of its chronology, status and attendant authenticating power. 
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Consequently, a recurring feature of postmodern performance is an intrinsically 
theoretical self-consciousness, a self-referentiality which encompasses the 'self 
of the artist and, no less centrally, the 'self of art. In deploying the style and 
denying the context, the re-located form is given not only distance but irony. By 
the same token, postmodernism advertises both its 'newness' and its 'knowing' 
through its ransacking of a selective back-catalogue, through its refusal to engage, 
on any other than its own eclectic terms, with the past that so patently sustains it. 
Naturally, not every theorist/practitioner regards the specific peculiarity 
of the present time as being unique enough (gradations of unique?) to bring into 
serious question, and still more serious doubt, the efficacy of previous forms. In 
ignoring the phenomenon of postmodernism (if one doesn't look at it, it doesn't 
exist?) one can maintain a faith in the models that worked in earlier times. In 
denying society the descriptor 'postmodern,' one is highly unlikely to regard 
postmodern performance as anything other than the formulaic application of 
pointless 'trends'; of vacuous content and cynical form; of the dysfunctional 
expression of a functional world. 
Expression itself forms only one aspect of art and some works of art are 
more overtly expressive than others . . . does this make them 'better'? With 
representational, mimetic, performance, we are generally given the situation and 
asked to imagine feeling the emotion . . . to empathize. With other types of work 
we might be presented with a stimulus to certain emotions without being given a 
contextualising situation. Narrative, for example, provides a situation, a frame, 
which allows the spectator to 'make sense' of the emotions engendered. The 
work often demonstrates a sort of self-reliance. It creates its own world ('the 
world of the play'), within which certain emotional states are located. With some 
work, with Chekhov and also with Brecht, both of whom explored narrative 
structures, the product is often possessed of complexity and depth. Whilst 
Chekhovian drama tends towards empathy, Brechtian drama asks that we question 
that which we see. It would be a crude and inaccurate distinction to say that the 
one makes us feel and the other makes us think. For our purposes, it is enough 
(here) to say that the frame, the narrative form, whether domestic or epic, linear 
or episodic, contextualizes that which is expressed. Performance art tends not to 
do this; an absence or fragmentation of narrative structure tends not to do this; 
certain processes intrinsic to views of postmodernism and deconstruction tend to 
disrupt this. If expression is not contextualized within the art-event itself, how 
do we assess it? Do we need to know the artist of the artist's intentions in order 
to know the art? 
Deconstruction, the exposing of the internal contradictions in texts, 
demonstrates a concern with the formal features at work within the narcological 
frame. Rather than being antithetical to authorial structure per se, the echoing 
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infamy (sic) of "The Death of the Author," deconstruction can be seen as a 
process towards a "better understanding of the fundamental structures of narrative 
. . . (an approach that offers) extremely accurate models for understanding the 
contemporary experience of the world as a construction, an artifice, a web of 
interdependent semiotic systems" (Waugh 9). There is an increasingly widely 
held view that works are identified by the forms and structures that make them 
and that the study of art, naturally, amounts to the study of form. We might say 
that content is what is done, whilst form is the way it is carried out. Any study 
which concentrates on the art itself, rather than the artist or the audience, will 
inevitably be concerned with formal features: in this way, questions of how the 
art-work is constructed become absolutely central (Kirby). 
Analysis of this type has been overtaken somewhat by critical responses 
to text in performance (or performance texts) which regard the written text as an 
incomplete and largely inaccurate aspect of the performative whole. Formalist 
analysis remains, however, a useful means of analyzing intention through 
authorial manipulation . . . if only to understand more fully the ways in which this 
original intent is subject to the inevitability of change. Nothing that is framed by 
or as 'art' can ever be said to speak for itself and the process of selection (the 
position from which we choose to view, the duration of the gaze, the most 
stridently 'objective' reading of the work) is never divorced from interpretation. 
Structuralism, itself an influential type of formalist criticism, places great 
stress on the relationship between different elements in a work of art. Formalist 
criticism not only draws attention to the relationship between the different 
elements at work in (within) an art-object or event, it will often regard the 
coherence of those elements into a unified whole as a supreme virture. 
Formalism by itself cannot really cope with the diversity of art (which happens 
when form is applied at random, as in certain 'Happenings,' for instance? 
(Sandford). Or when formal elements are deliberately and disconcertingly 
juxtaposed? Not all works of art that we might regard as 'successful' succeed 
because of the unified ordering of their elements and works of art, in the final 
analysis, are not independent of their makers. Can we read or in any way 
'receive' Shakespeare's work without having our reception shaped by our 
mythologizing of the man and our canonizing of his work? Without filtering our 
responses through the Arnoldesque assertion that the 'high' art of Shakespeare is 
a civilizing agent, comprised—in some non-contestable way—of the "best that has 
been thought and said in the world" (Arnold)? 
Interpretation takes the place of meaning. One could argue that the 
discussion or notion of 'meaning' might be best (only ever) reserved for those 
works of (performance) art where a precise correlation between the signifier and 
that which is signified is in attendance . . . and these, if they exist at all as other 
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than a nostalgic faith in clarity, are in an extreme minority. In general, we might 
more safely say, that even with the most seemingly 'obvious' works, the maker's 
creative and intellectual faculties are brought to bear in order to show 'how things 
might be,' rather than in the transmission of specific 'meaning.' Even when a 
theatrical work has the transmission of meaning as its avowed intention, it is 
almost certainly true to say that the subsequent reception of that meaning is 
determined by a variety of factors, many of which are beyond the control of the 
artist. Current perspectives function through a recognition that performance is 
mediated by a vast array of meaning-making phenomena, each of which is subject 
to its own value-system. Not only can the complicated manner of the showing 
never be fully divorced from that which is shown, but the receiver of the art has 
to filter the artist's intention (itself a sometimes elusive term) through her or his 
own mood, intention, experience, state of receptivity, politics, prejudices, 
intelligence, desires, etc. (the list of 'factors' in our processes of understanding 
is vast). 
An ability to critique a work of art allows us not so much to uncover a 
single, exclusive meaning (mono-interpretation) as to arrive at (academically?) 
justifiable ways of articulating our responses . . . which are themselves arrived 
at with a recognition that alternative views are not so much acceptable as 
inevitable. 
The late Michael Kirby preferred to speak of 'Referential' and 'Non-
Referential' theatre rather than the overtly valuable 'meaningful' and the 
intrinsically pejorative 'meaningless.' For Kirby, there could be work without 
meaning, but there could never be work without significance . . . the example he 
used is the now-famous Rorschach ink-blot: the Rorschach test exists as a near-
perfect example of interpretation, of significance without meaning. Although no 
'message' is sent (in as much as the ink-blot is formed by chance) the 'created' 
image is open to a multiplicity of interpretations, each of which is, by definition, 
justfiable. Whilst not all theatre aspires to this state of absolute non-referentiality, 
certain examples do. In theatre, as in art generally (generically) the absence of 
an overt or simplistic 'meaning' is no indication that the work is without 
'significance.' 
Does this mean that performance is an appropriate site for work which 
is either 'private,' 'non-emotional' or 'anti-mimetic'? Do any definitions of 
performance exist which satisfy even the brief criteria contained in this paper? 
Is Boal wrong when he demands passion rather than banality? (Boal, A). Is 
Barba wrong when he specifies the application of extra-daily technique? (Barba 
and Savarese). Is Scheduler wrong in his analogy of the raw and the cooked? 
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The word 'Theatre' originates from the Greek 'Theatron,' meaning, 
literally, 'where you view.' 'Theory' comes from the same source. It meant 
then, and means now, contemplation, looking at, investigation. 
Theatre is and always has been the location and the theory of looking. 
Theory and theatre are not merely the mutually compatible areas of Patrice Pavis' 
non-hierarchical relationship between 'doing' and 'thinking' (Pavis), any more 
than they can be said to exist at Marjorie Perloff's point wherein "to talk about 
art becomes equivalent to making it" (Perloff 90), they are one and the same 
phenomenon, inseparable, indivisible. Theatre is at once both the location (the 
site) and the act (the sight) of theoretical encounter. Whilst no one theory can lay 
claim to anything approaching the universal appeal for validity of those 
'movements' aligned to the long-defunct avant-garde, to speak now of a theatre 
beyond theory, or, more perversely, to theorize about the 'theory-death' of 
performance, is to enter into an acute engagement with precisely that which the 
words themselves are seeking so resolutely to resist. Theatre is a discursive act 
and the 'frame' around the performance is always already as much a frame of 
mind as a frame of space or time. 
The slip of stability. The breaking and re-making of the frame. The 
expansion of performance beyond the limits of convention. Progressive 
performance is the theatricalization of theory, the showing of thinking through the 
showing of show . . . no longer an act of creation, held up to theoretical 
interrogation, but an act of theoretical interrogation in itself. An act of theory. 
An act of looking. 
University College, Chester 
University of Liverpool 
Note 
1. Tomkins, Calvin. Duchamp. Chatto and Windus, 1997. 576. 
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